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Isolation in Cloud Computing
and Privacy-Enhancing Technologies
Suitability of Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for Separating
Data Usage in Business Processes
Sustainability of Cloud Computing is assured for the uncritical services only. There is
basically no company that entrusts critical data to a Cloud. Cloud Computing does not
realize its potentials as far a cost reduction in IT is concerned. The reason is the lack of
isolation. Isolation can be seen as a special sort of privacy, where the a service should not
get in contact with other services, and the provider of the Cloud should not know what data
are used in the service and for what purpose the service is used by the customer.
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1 The Three Layers of Cloud
Services
Cloud Computing breaks open the access control domain of individuals’ and
companies’ IT systems by processing
their data within application frameworks
and virtualized runtime environments of
Cloud service providers. Cloud services
are available as software services with
standardized interfaces hiding their implementation. Hence, it is possible to
make use of application services, application frameworks, and runtime environments of different service providers
by combining them for the execution
of a business process. Depending on
the kind of Cloud service, it belongs
to one of three abstraction layers: Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as
a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as
a Service (IaaS) (Mather et al. 2009).
SaaS stands for application services, e.g.,
office, e-mail, billing, and customerrelationship management applications.
SaaS implements mainly function modules of business processes. The next abstraction layer PaaS provides the application framework for implementing and
hosting Cloud application services. The
third abstraction layer IaaS offers computing and data storage facilities as well
as operating systems as a software stack.
Thereby, providers of the Cloud services
can differ and services can be executed in
different Clouds. Due to the on-demand
characteristics of Cloud Computing, the
usage of Cloud services of given service
providers should be possible for different orchestrations of business processes
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of (competing) Cloud users (availability
of Cloud services). Hence, a Cloud service of one service provider could provide
the same function to instances of business processes, each belonging to a competing Cloud user. Thus, a flow of the
Cloud users’ data between different business processes via Cloud services – either
of Cloud service providers or of other
Cloud users – is possible.
This article provides a survey of the
suitability of privacy-enhancing technologies for achieving isolation in Cloud
Computing. Thereby, the Cloud user as
owner of his data takes the role of an individual as the data subject of his data.
Sustainability of Cloud Computing is assured for the uncritical services only. Basically no company entrusts critical data
to a Cloud. Cloud Computing does not
realize its potentials as far a cost reduction in IT is concerned due to the lack
of isolation. Isolation can be seen as a
special sort of privacy, where the service
should not be making contact with other
services, and the provider of the Cloud
should not know what data are used in
the service and for what purpose the service is used by the customer.
Today’s security mechanism for isolation in Cloud Computing is virtualization (Armbrust et al. 2010). Virtualization encapsulates hardware, operating
systems, or application frameworks respectively; it is their logical representation by software. Although virtualization
can separate different service providers
within a Cloud, firstly the virtualization mechanisms are controlled by the
provider of the corresponding resource
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and not by the Cloud user; and secondly
this virtualization does not hold if Cloud
services from different service providers
are used horizontally on the same abstraction layer, such as SaaS, or vertically across different abstraction layers.
However, this should be possible so that
Cloud users can select on-demand the
currently most suitable service for running their business process in a Cloud.
This property corresponds to a liveness
property meaning “let good things happen” (Alpern and Schneider 1985).
Privacy-enhancing technologies focus
mainly on confidentiality of personal
data and on avoiding a linking of an individual’s transactions to prevent nonauthorized profiling. These properties
derive from the privacy of informational self-determination which requires
the ability of individuals to control the
disclosure of their data (Westin 1967;
Bundesverfassungsgericht 1983).
This state of the art contribution describes risks and thus stresses that security – as understood in computer science
– is most likely impossible and not even
desirable. The key term to sustainability
is seen as the ability to isolate services
from each other. Experience with exactly
this property is available in the field of
privacy. Cloud and its desire to orchestrate services requires that the service requestor has the possibility to formulate
his own security policies, and to delegate
rights and to control the usage of data
and service results. These key technologies will be discussed in the following.

2 Risks for Conﬁdentiality
of Cloud Users’ Data
According to the abstract system model
of Pretschner et al. (2006), participants
in an information system take the role
of a data provider and data consumer. If
a participant discloses (personal) data d
to another participant, the sending participants acts as a data provider whereas
the receiving participant acts as a data
consumer. Roles can change dynamically.
If the receiving participant discloses the
data d or a modified/extended data set d ,
then it changes its role from a data consumer to a data provider. Figure 1 shows
the instantiation of this model on Cloud
Computing. Services SaaS2 and SaaS3 of
the abstraction layer SaaS use the same
service PaaS2 of the abstraction layer
PaaS.
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Fig. 1 Data ﬂow in Cloud Computing according to the system model of Pretschner
et al. (2006)

Fig. 2 Possible data ﬂows of Cloud users’ data via Cloud services
Due to the on-demand characteristics
of Cloud Computing, the usage of the
same Cloud services should be possible
for different orchestrations of business
processes of (competing) Cloud users
(availability of Cloud services). Hence, a
Cloud service of one service provider
could provide the same function to at
least two instances of a business process belonging to competing Cloud users.
Thereby, a (non-authorized) flow of these
Cloud users’ data between the business
processes via the Cloud services is possible and has to be prevented to achieve isolation. Figure 2 shows the possible data
flows of data d from the orchestration
of a business process of Cloud user Um
to the orchestration of a business process
of a (competing) Cloud user Un by the
Cloud service Si and the Cloud services
Si and Sj , respectively. It is assumed that
these services are not vulnerable against
attacks, such as guest-hopping attacks.
These data flows are carried out without authorization of the Cloud user Um .
They violate the IT-Security protection
goal of confidentiality.
 Case A: The Cloud service Si reads d
from the dataset of Um and writes d
into the dataset of Un .

Case B: The Cloud service Si reads d
from the dataset of Um and sends d to
the Cloud service Sj . The Cloud service
Sj writes d into the dataset of Un .
 Case C: The Cloud service Si reads
d from the dataset of Um and writes
d into the dataset of Uk . The Cloud
user Uk is not in competition with the
Cloud users Um and Un . The Cloud
service Sj has access to the dataset of
Uk , reads d from this dataset and writes
it into the dataset of Un .
The exemplary case study “Telemedicine” in which medical services and
companies make use of Cloud services
and personal data (x-ray images) of patients illustrates these possible data flows.
A commercial provider of an Electronic
Health Record (EHR) data service collects health data from its users (patients)
with their agreement for the purpose of
sharing the data among others with clinics, health insurance agencies, and pharmaceutical companies. Existing systems
comply with the US American Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (US Department of Health & Human
Services 1996) by letting users decide on
the usage and disclosure of their medical
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data. However, they do not offer mechanisms in order to enforce the rules of
a privacy policy (Haas et al. 2010). Let
us assume that a patient needs medical
treatment abroad. A clinic in the homeland has shot an x-ray image of the patient and has disclosed it to a data centre.
Patients have shown their digital identity
to the first service provider, i.e., the clinic
in the homeland, and have agreed on
obligations for disclosing their medical
data via an EHR data service to a hospital
and to a clinic abroad. Additional disclosures of these data are not permitted. If
in general at least one participant makes
use of a Cloud service for the usage of
the patients’ health data, non-authorized
disclosure of health data to a third party
might take place, if data are disclosed by
the service itself (cases A and B), e.g., by
the EHR service, or via the used Cloud
services of the lower layer (IaaS or Paas).

3 Privacy and Legal Requirements
In view of the spread of electronic data
processing, the information flow of personal data was included in the term of
privacy by Alan Westin: “Privacy is the
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others” (Westin
1967). The protection of personal data
for its collection and use under the concept of informational self-determination
was specified in 1983 for the first time
by the German Federal Constitutional
Court in the so-called “census judgment” (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1983).
This judgment limits the right to informational self-determination, if there is a
substantial general interest for the limitation.
The named technical development and
resulting threats for privacy led to the
European data protection acts (Roßnagel 2005). The general basic principles are transcribed in the European
Data Privacy Directive 95/46/EC (European Commission 1995) which was extended to a general electronic communication by the European Data Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC (European Commission 2002):
 Transparency
of data processing
through briefing and notification of
the person concerned,
 Necessity of the data collected for a certain purpose,
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Restriction of data processing to a certain purpose,
 Correction rights of the person concerned regarding the required data and
the processing phases,
 Data avoidance and data economy,
 Data protection through technology,
and
 Implementation
control through a
data protection representative.
The minimal principles for privacy
protection found in the named Data Privacy Directive of the European Union
originate from the Fair Information Practices. These principles were first published in the United States Departments
for Health Education and Welfare (HEW)
report and were incorporated in the US
Privacy Act of 1974 (Smith 1993). The five
principles of Fair Information Practices
were accepted by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and standardized in the form of
eight principles for the protection of privacy in cross-frontier data exchange in
the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data (OECD 1980).
Privacy according to data protection
legislations can be seen as processing personal data for a specific usage by a specific
party and with the consent of the corresponding individual. Hence, by their security principles data protection legislations define access to data according to
the principle of least privilege. If a Cloud
service violates such a security principle,
the privacy of the corresponding individual has been violated.


4 Privacy-Enhancing
Technologies and Isolation
Privacy-enhancing technologies (PET)
aim at supporting individuals in controlling the disclosure of their data according to the agreed-upon privacy policy between the corresponding individual and service provider. A privacy policy consists of rules regarding the collection, processing, and storage of personal
data as well as regarding their disclosure to third parties by the data collecting party. Privacy policies are formalized
by privacy policy languages in a machinereadable form enabling automatic decisions on requests to access personal data.
PET should enable individuals to enforce
these privacy policies or at least to check
whether participating service providers
follow the agreed-upon privacy policy.
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PET can be grouped into (a) privacy policy languages, (b) encryption schemes,
and (c) anonymity and pseudonymity.
This section investigates the state of the
art of PET with regard to their suitability
for isolation of data usage in Cloud Computing.
4.1 Privacy Policy Languages
P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences)
for formalizing privacy policies has been
standardized in 2002 by the W3C (World
Wide Web Consortium) (Cranor et al.
2002). A P3P policy consists of rules published by a service provider on his website. A web browser with a P3P implementation automatically reads this P3P
policy and compares it with the privacy
preference of the corresponding individual. An individual gives his agreement to
the collection and processing of the given
personal data by agreeing to a P3P policy. P3P supports a disclosure of personal
data to third parties by a P3P attribute for
the recipient of the data and the kind of
data processing. However, this attribute
refers only to those data which have been
directly collected from the individual.
In addition, even though P3P supports
transparency of data processing by enabling machine-readable privacy policies,
its vocabulary is restricted to contact details of individuals. It does not support
an extension of the vocabulary. Furthermore, rules for the disclosure of personal
data to third parties apply only to those
data which have been directly collected
from the individual. Hence, P3P does not
consider a chain of data disclosures to
third parties and therefore is not suitable
for the formalization of isolating data usage in Cloud Computing.
EPAL (Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language) considers the formulation of privacy policies within a company
(Ashley et al. 2003). The aim is that service providers can substantiate that they
have followed their privacy policy, e.g.
published as a P3P policy (Karjoth et
al. 2002). Therefore, an EPAL policy is
linked to the corresponding personal data
so that access requests to these data can
be decided based upon this EPAL policy. This is called sticky policy (Karjoth et
al. 2003). EPAL does not provide a vocabulary but a list of hierarchies of datacategories, user-categories, purposes, set
of actions, conditions, and obligations.
EPAL considers a successive disclosure of
personal data to third parties by rules
regarding the data consumers and their
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processing of the corresponding personal
data. According to the concept of sticky
policies, the EPAL policy is passed on together with the corresponding personal
data. However, EPAL does not support
an interaction with the individuals/data
owners.
4.2 Encryption Schemes
An implementation of sticky policies for
disclosure of personal data to third parties is the Adaptive PMS (Adaptive Privacy Management System) of HewlettPackard (Casassa and Pearson 2005).
Adaptive PMS links sticky policies to certain personal data at the time of their
collection by means of an encryption
scheme. A data center stores encrypted
personal data of several individuals for
the purpose of their disclosure to a third
party. A data consumer will obtain the
decryption key from a TTP (Trusted
Third Party), if he is authorized by the
sticky policy. That means that the data
center obtains the encrypted individual’s
data. Hence, it cannot conduct additional
services on the collected data. In addition, data consumers can further disclose
the decrypted personal data without any
control by the individual or the TTP.
Homomorphic encryption achieves
the confidentiality of the individual’s data
while at the same time enabling the use
of these data for statistics, e.g. for benchmarking. It is an instance of multi-party
computation meaning that several parties
participate in a protocol and keep their
input values confidential (Goldreich et al.
1987; Kerschbaum 2008; Bogetoft et al.
2009). By using homomorphic encryption schemes, personal data can be kept
confidential for a computation, however
they are not suitable if data in cleartext
are required.
4.3 Anonymity and Pseudonymity
Mechanisms
Anonymity and pseudonymity mechanisms aim at non-linkability of individual’s transactions. Both focus on the
collection of personal data. Whereas
anonymity mechanisms are not suitable
for personalized service since they either
give unlimited access to personal data
or prohibit any access, pseudonymity
mechanisms allow a controlled disclosure of a subset of an individual’s personal data. In 1985, David Chaum introduced the concept of identity management for non-linkability by using
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pseudonyms for authentication. The aim
is both to protect an individual against a
non-authorized data collection and profiling and to assure accountability of their
transactions (Chaum 1985). The aim of
current identity management systems is
twofold: to preserve informational selfdetermination and to simplify authentication in the sense of Single Sign-On
(SSO). Our investigation embraces the
authentication protocols of the following identity management systems and
protocols: Shibboleth (Erdos and Cantor 2004), Liberty Alliance (Wason 2004),
iManager (Wohlgemuth et al. 2004), and
IBM idemix (Camenisch and van Herreweghen 2002).
Shibboleth and Liberty Alliance are
identity management systems with an
identity provider. The role of an identity provider is to certify an individual’s
identity and to manage his attributes.
This implies two different trust models. Firstly, an identity provider is a certification authority (CA), and service
providers as well as individuals trust a CA
to certify identities according to its certification policy. This is the usual trust
model as it is used in public-key infrastructures (Ford and Baum 1997). Secondly, since an identity provider manages an individual’s attributes such as his
pseudonyms, an identity provider is able
to trace this individual. It follows that a
user has to trust his identity provider to
keep the user’s attributes in confidence
according to the agreed privacy policy.
This is the difference to a CA, so we call
an identity provider with these trust relationships a privacy CA.
The identity manager iManager focuses on the usability of identity management for security novices by managing
the identity of its user by means of partial identities and self-signed credentials.
IBM idemix is an anonymous credential
system and part of the PRIME identity
management system (Camenisch et al.
2005). Its main property is that an individual can use the same anonymous credentials with several pseudonyms. Hence,
the individual’s transactions are nonlinkable and accountable. Even the credential issuing party, e.g., a CA, cannot
link these transactions with additional
information.
However, if these identity management
systems are applied to business processes
requiring disclosure of personal data to
third parties, individuals will lose control
of the usage of their credentials. If these

credentials were used to access the individual’s data which are stored at another
service provider, this individual would
lose control on the disclosure of these
data. This is due to the fact that identity
management systems follow the all-ornothing delegation principle (Wohlgemuth and Müller 2006).

5 Usage Control and Enforcement
of Services
In principle PET realizes access control
on personal data, which is controlled by
the respective individual. However, PET
assume that (a) the user is aware of the
data collection and (b) pseudonymized
or encrypted data are sufficient to be
used by service providers. An unconscious data collection undermines the
protection by PET (Sackmann et al. 2006)
and business processes for personalized
services require personal data in clear text
(Wohlgemuth 2008).
The concept of usage control extends
the access control by means of rules
which have to be followed after access
has taken place (Park and Sandhu 2004).
These rules are called obligations. They
describe acceptable states of for the usage of personal data without restricting
their access in advance. Together with the
rules for obtaining access to data – provisions – obligations are part of a privacy
policy. While provisions define known
safety properties and are therefore decidable, obligations are in general not decidable from a start but can become so
during the execution of a process. If obligations specify a restricted timeline for
their enforcement, they are observable.
However, non-observable obligations can
be transformed into more strict and observable obligations. Depending on their
type, obligations can be enforced by usage control mechanisms (a) before, (b)
during, and (c) after an execution of a
business process.
The enforcement of obligations is
linked to their properties of controllability and observability (Hilty et al.
2005). Regarding controllability, a data
provider can ensure that a data consumer enforces the agreed-upon obligations, e.g., by extending his access control
domain to the data consumer with mechanisms of Digital Rights Management or
by verifying the data consumer’s process for using the disclosed data. However, this is not always practicable. On
the other hand, observability means that
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a data provider can check whether a data
consumer has followed the agreed-upon
obligations without extending his access
control domain. Observable obligations
are rules that can be enforced directly
by the data provider’s reference monitor, e.g., “re-access the data within the
next k days”. Non-observable delegations
are access requests which are outside of
the data provider’s reference monitor’s
domain, e.g., “do not disclosure data to
given third parties”, “use data only for the
agreed-upon purposes”, and “delete data
after k days at the latest”. To enforce nonobservable obligations, a reference monitor should be enhanced by taking signals of the data consumer into account or
to decrease the data quality (Pretschner
et al. 2006; Sackmann 2007). A reference
monitor is a trusted component intercepting each and every request to the system. That means a reference monitor mediates the complete access to the system
and its resources, and it may not be possible to alter it (Anderson 1972).
5.1 Enforcement of Obligations
Obligations can be enforced before access to data, e.g., by integrating organizational control instruments into a business
process and by verifying before its execution whether the process includes such
controls. At the moment the data is accessed, this can be done e.g. by a monitor with a history of events and knowledge of the probable future process executions or by encrypting personal data
before disclosing it. After an access obligations can be enforced by an audit regarding the granted access requests by the
data consumer (Müller et al. 2010). In order to enforce obligations before access
to personal data has taken place, patterns
for control instruments can be integrated
into the business process to be executed
(Namiri and Stojanovic 2007). The drawbacks are that a business process cannot
be changed afterwards. If the personal
data have to be used in clear text, encryption protects only one disclosure of personal data to a third party. At the time of
access, reference monitors could decide
on the access request based upon a likelihood calculation regarding a violation
of an obligation if access is granted. After access has been granted and the data
have been decrypted, a data provider has
no control of the usage of the data in clear
text. Ex post enforcement of obligations
is achieved by an audit. An audit takes the
Business & Information Systems Engineering

granted accesses to personal data into account. Thereby, a usage of personal data
by the data consumer and a further disclosure of personal data to third parties
can be checked by an auditor, e.g. a data
protection officer. Privacy evidences are
a result of an audit and indicate possible
violations of an obligation (Sackmann
2007). EXAMINA (Accorsi 2008) inverts
policy rules in order to identify violations
by one service by means of falsification.
The APPLE framework defines a logic
for an ex post enforcement of policies
on trust management (Etalle and Winsborough 2007). This logic framework using logs to verify that actions taken by
the system were authorized, assumes a secure system. This is in contradiction to
our assumption that Cloud services may
violate the agreed-upon privacy policy.
The Optimistic Security Model of Povey
(1999) presents a formal model to ensure
that a rollback of an information system
from executed privileges/policy breaches
is possible. The protection goal however
is integrity of the system and not confidentiality. If data were no longer confidential, a rollback of the system would
not restore the confidentiality of data.
5.2 Delegation of Rights
Our proposal is to establish isolation by
defining the authorized cooperation relationship between Cloud users and Cloud
services, i.e. defining the authorized data
flows. Since a cooperation relationship
depends on the instance of a business
process in a Cloud, the privacy policy
(authorizations) must be modifiable according to the business process and revocable if a cooperation relationship does
no longer exist. Our approach makes use
of distributed trust management of credentials (Blaze et al. 1996), since it supports a case-by-case issue and revocation
of authorizations by binding them to credentials. Credentials are a representation
of access rights, which are delegated to
service providers to obtain access to personal data in agreement with the individual in question. After having granted access to personal data, they are no longer
in the access control domain of the data
provider. The access control model consists of two access control domains each
possessing a reference monitor for access
decisions: the individual’s domain and a
service provider’s domain. The individual (in the role of the data subject) specifies these access decisions by delegating
the access rights together with obligations
3|2011

for using these access rights to the requesting service provider (in the role of a
data consumer). To obtain a user’s agreement for each disclosure of his personal
data to a third party, it should be possible
to delegate rights and to revoke them for
a single disclosure. Thereby, a delegation
of rights defines a collaboration between
service providers including the exchange
of given user’s personal data between
them. Figure 3 shows the usage control
model with the delegation of rights. Ellipses represent a reference monitor. The
dashed line shows a delegation of a right r
from a data subject to a subject in the role
of a data consumer. The continuous lines
represent granted access to the personal
data d of the individual. In the data subject’ domain, the user controls access to
his personal data; in the service provider’s
domain, the service provider 2 controls
access to the user’s data according to the
enforcement of the delegated right r. The
service provider 1 shows his authorization to obtain access to the personal data
d by showing the right r to the service
provider 2.
Our approach consists of the following
participants:
 Cloud user: A Cloud user acts as a data
provider to Cloud services by disclosing his data to them. According to the
requirement of data protection legislations authorizing the processing of
personal data on the premise of the
corresponding individual’s agreement,
the Cloud user acts as the data owner
and delegates the authorizations to the
cooperating Cloud services.
 Cloud services: A Cloud service acts
as data consumer under the identity of
his service provider when processing
the data of a Cloud user. According to
Pretschner et al. (2006) a Cloud service
acts as a data provider if it discloses the
data to another Cloud service which
then acts as a data consumer.
 Auditor: An auditor checks whether an
authorization of a privacy policy has
been violated. If a privacy policy has
been violated, the auditor should identify the originator of this privacy policy violation, i.e. identify the Cloud
service which has disclosed the Cloud
user’s data to another Cloud service
without the authorization of the Cloud
user as owner of the corresponding
data.
 Certification authority: A CA certifies
the identities of the participants and issues authorizations to Cloud services
on behalf of the Cloud user as the data
159
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Fig. 3 Access control
domains of delegation of
rights

owner. In addition, a certification authority ensures the availability of the
delegated authorizations to an auditor.
The assumptions are as follows:
 The CA has certified the identity of every participant in the system.
 Every participant protects access to its
data storage by an access control system.
 A participant can only access data of
another participant if the latter has
successfully shown his certified identity to the access control system of the
Cloud service.
 Access rights are of the set of rules
{read, write, delete}.
The requirements for isolation of data
usage in Cloud Computing by delegation
of rights are:
 Access to a Cloud user’s data is only
granted if the requesting Cloud service
possesses the corresponding valid authorization. Thereby it is possible for a
Cloud service to obtain access to data
of different Cloud users as long as they
have authorized the Cloud service to
access the data. If a Cloud service requests data without showing a valid
authorization, the access request must
be denied.
 A CA only issues an authorization to
a service provider for access to data of
a user (data owner) stored at another
service provider, if the corresponding
Cloud user (data owner) has explicitly
agreed to the requested data access. An
authorization issued by a CA proves to
an auditor that the corresponding user
has given his agreement to the service
provider to obtain access to his data
within a business process.
 Only the participating services should
get access to those Cloud user’s data
which are necessary to run the business
160









process. Additional data of the Cloud
user should not be disclosed or gained
by the delegation of the authorizations.
A Cloud service Si is allowed to write
data d of Cloud user Um into the
dataset Cloud user Un , if
• Cloud user Um has given the Cloud
service Si the authorization to write
d into the dataset of Un or if the data
d have been anonymized AND
• Cloud user Un has given the Cloud
service Si the authorization to write
d into its dataset.
A Cloud service Si is allowed to send
d of Cloud user Um to the Cloud service Sj , if Cloud user Um has given the
Cloud service Sj the authorization to
read d from Cloud service Sj or the
data d have been anonymized.
If a data owner has removed the authorization to access data d for the Cloud
service Si , then Cloud service Si has to
delete the corresponding data d. This
has to be done recursively.
To enable an auditor to identify the
originator of a non-authorized disclosure of a Cloud user’s data, the history
of the Cloud user’s data flow has to
be documented with the data. This ensures that the auditor can re-construct
the data flow and compare it with the
delegated authorizations of the corresponding Cloud user.

5.3 DREISAM–An Experimental System
for Usage Control
The DREISAM protocols extend identity
management to a non-linkable delegation and revocation of rights. Their novelty is (a) to grant access to given personal data without disclosing any further
identifying data about the individual and
(b) to keep the personal data in clear text

so that the data center can use them for
its service according to the agreed-upon
privacy policy. Therefore, these protocols
combine the mechanisms for delegation
of rights by credentials with mechanisms
for enforcing non-linkability when using
credentials. These are the building blocks
of the DREISAM credential system.
The non-linkability mechanisms for
credentials are cryptographic modules.
Anonymous credentials, as they are used
by IBM idemix, make use of a cryptographic commitment scheme for binding authorizations to a cryptographic
key and of zero-knowledge proofs for
showing this relationship without revealing any identifying data, but with the
mentioned disadvantage of the all-ornothing delegation. An identity manager
of the individual’s client software uses the
anonymous credentials of the user and
executes its delegation decisions.
A proxy credential replaces the sharing of an individual’s master identity and
cryptographic key k. For the CA it represents the individual’s delegation request
for a certain right to a service provider. If
the service provider obtains a proxy credential, he has the individual’s authorization to get the requested access right by
means of an anonymous credential.
The CA logs requests from users and
service providers with the issued proxy
and anonymous credentials in the delegation list. This list is a realization of
the access control matrix (Harrison et
al. 1976). The CA uses this list to check
the service providers’ requests for anonymous credentials and to resolve disputes
between users and service providers. An
entry of this list refers to the delegation of an access right of the user to service providers. To allow the CA to resolve disputes, the pertinent credential of
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the user is stored together with the transcript of the showing protocol’s run. To
enforce the maximum number of access
rights uses, the CA records the number
of issuances of anonymous credentials to
service providers and issues only anonymous one-show credentials concerning a
delegation.
A detailed description of the DREISAM
protocols and their proof-of-concept implementation for the example of customer relationship management is given
in Wohlgemuth and Müller (2006).

6 Outlook
Access control and security policies are
not sufficient to assure isolation in Cloud
processing on all three layers of Cloud usage. The reason is that granting access is
just the first step when meeting the challenge of isolation in Clouds. The data and
information flows, as they can be seen in
the actual service usage, are of economic
interest. They should be determined on
a contractual basis. The key to this is
the specification of obligations and delegations of rights as well as the enforcement of these characteristics. With the
DREISAM protocols for a non-linkable
delegation of rights, one aspect has been
shown. The definition of data disclosure
to third parties without disclosing the individual’s additional data is one important aspect among others. Especially the
enforcement of delegated rights remains
an open issue.
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Abstract
Noboru Sonehara, Isao Echizen,
Sven Wohlgemuth

Isolation in Cloud Computing
and Privacy-Enhancing
Technologies
Suitability of Privacy-Enhancing
Technologies for Separating Data
Usage in Business Processes
Cloud Computing lifts the borders between the access control domain of individuals’ and companies’ IT systems
by processing their data within the application frameworks and virtualized
runtime environments of Cloud service
providers. A deployment of traditional
security policies for enforcing conﬁdentiality of Cloud users’ data would
lead to a conﬂict with the availability
of the Cloud’s software services: conﬁdentiality of data would be assured but
Cloud services would not be available
for every user of a Cloud. This stateof-the-art contribution shows the analogy of the conﬁdentiality of external
data processing by Cloud services with
mechanisms known and applied in privacy. Sustainability in Cloud is a matter
of privacy, which in Cloud is called “isolation”.
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Isolation, Privacy, Usage control, Delegation of rights
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